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‘False Friends? Testing Commercial lawyers on the claim that Zealous Advocacy is 
Founded in Benevolence towards Clients rather than Lawyers Personal Interest’ 
Richard Moorhead* and Rachel Cahill-O’Callaghan** 
 
ABSTRACT 
Commercial lawyers often signal that ‘client first’ is an essential element of their DNA, and 
some scholarly proponents have laid claim to a moral justification for zeal. That moral 
justification is found, in particular, in the notion of lawyers as friends. One critique of zeal is 
that this moral claim is bogus: that ‘client-first’ is a convenient trope for disguised self-
interest. This paper explores the empirical validity of this ‘client first’ ideal through a value-
based analysis of zeal in lawyering. Our data suggest plausible differences in ethical decision-
making related to those values. The data are consistent with more zealous lawyers having 
stronger self-interested rather than client-interested motivations. More zealous lawyers are 
also less constrained by valuing conformity to rules. If our results are valid, they suggest that 
the claim that zeal is motivated by placing a high value on the interests of the client is false. 
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There is a growing interest in what the behavioural sciences can tell us about legal ethics.1 
This paper examines what a well validated values instrument may tell us about some of the 
theoretical claims made for zealous advocacy.  While the topic is of broad relevance, in the 
context of this Special Issue we focus on survey data collected from experienced commercial 
practitioners in private practice and in-house. We examine associations between those 
practitioners values and their inclinations towards zeal. In so doing we tease out whether a 
claimed referent of zeal, client loyalty is associated with greater zeal or whether zeal is more 
often associated with lawyer self-interest.  
Context  
Commercial lawyers have played a role in serious wrongdoings that throw into sharp relief 
the importance of re-examining arguments about zealous advocacy. Various in-house and 
private practice lawyers have opined and/or assisted in wire-stripping by BNP Paribas and 
Standard Chartered Bank, and the legal aftermath of hacking at News of the World and The 
Times.2  Allen & Overy were accused by a Crown Court judge of putting inappropriate 
pressure on a prosecution witness leading to an abortive trial.3 Clifford Chance litigated a 
client’s fraud case which was found by a (now) Court of Appeal judge to be to be artificial 
and ‘replete with defects, illogicalities and inherent improbabilitiew’.4 That raised serious 
professional misconduct issues.5 Evidence during a Russian Oligarch’s trials was ‘polished’.6 
Two former Barclays general counsels have been interviewed under caution. 7  In-house 
lawyers at General Motors have been in the spotlight for the way they dealt with fatal accident 
claims.8 And some banks had a practice of sending letters from fake law firms.9  
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Within this group, several lawyers have been fired, some investigated (including criminally) 
and at least one prosecuted successfully by their regulators. Equally, some remain 
unpunished, perhaps tolerated or even supported by the regulators.10 Such case studies above 
contain a range of behaviour from those zealously pursuing the client’s interests in ways seen 
to be clearly illegal to those merely seen as professionally questionable. Some may even see 
some of these examples of such zeal as defensible within the finest traditions of a profession 
fearlessly representing its clients’ interests. In the main, we do not know whether all or some 
of these lawyers breached the law or their professional codes. Yet each of these case studies 
shines its own light on a signature debate surrounding legal ethics: to what extent lawyers 
should be zealous advocates for their clients? 
Zealous advocacy in its strongest form is based on the idea that lawyers should be dedicated 
to serving their clients’ ends by all means possible unless such means are unlawful or 
prohibited by rules of conduct. It is an idea broadly uncontroversial in the profession but very 
controversial within the academy.11 The controversy stems from the contested boundaries of 
lawfulness and professional ethics. Do legal boundaries only restrain action where something 
is certain and clearly prohibited by law or professional conduct rules, or do they still restrain 
when the law and rules are unclear?12 While good lawyers are ‘professionally obligated to 
pursue the interests of their clients’, partisanship may lead the lawyer to push the legal limits 
to the benefit of the client and the detriment of others.13 As our examples above show, zeal 
can also ultimately damage the interests of the client and the lawyer. 
In the academic literature, such debates have often been the focus of a moral philosophical 
inquiry, centred on whether it is possible to be both a good lawyer and good person.14 Where 
the law and professional rules are unclear, can a lawyer be a good person if they assist clients 
with probably illegal actions where there is an argument that the action may be legal? Can 
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they advance legal but morally reprehensible actions? Can they advance lawful and just ends 
by means that are questionable in legal or ethical terms? 
The jurisprudential philosophy of zealous advocacy tends towards answering these questions 
with a yes, albeit sometimes a qualified yes.15 The justifications for doing so and in particular 
the reasons for dedicating oneself as a lawyer to zealous advocacy are partly centred on 
individual rights and pluralism.16 Pepper and Dare argue that the client rights should be 
prioritised and not inhibited by a lawyer’s queasiness about the morality of advancing those 
rights or by a lawyer’s doubts about the extent of those rights in law. In uncertain situations, 
in matters of law and legal process, the zealous lawyers should give effect to the client’s 
rights and promote their client’s priorities over their own. Markovits suggests that lawyers, 
‘should try aggressively to manipulate both the facts and the law to suit their clients’ 
purposes’.17  
A justification for zealous advocacy from moral philosophy makes a particular virtue of 
prioritising another’s interest (the client’s) over all others, with the lawyer deriving moral 
worth from selfless dedication to the client. Indeed, Charles Fried in his seminal piece on the 
‘The Lawyer as Friend’ argues that: 
[In] relations friendship, kinship, we recognize an authorization to take the interests of 
particular concrete persons more seriously and to give them priority over the interests 
of the wider collectivity.18 
For Fried, paying special attention and prioritising the client’s rights is intrinsically justified; 
this ‘preference grows out of the profoundest springs of morality: the concepts of personality, 
identity, and liberty.’19 In this context, the lawyer is seen as special-purpose friend, a friend 
who acts in the client’s interests, not their own; or more specifically who adopts the client’s 
interests as their own.20 
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More recently Markovits extends this argument proposing that the foundation for zeal derives 
its moral worth from lawyering being, ‘intimately connected to the deep and enduring ethical 
ideal of respect for persons.’21 This respect for persons requires lawyers to suppress, ‘their 
own judgments of truth and justice’ and to do so through a notion of fidelity to the client’s 
interests that includes, ‘partisan partiality in favour of clients over others’ and a strong form 
of identification with the client that requires them to think themselves into the position of the 
client.22 The virtue comes in them developing the skill to do this but also in, ‘self-effacement 
in lawyers who are cast as servants’, who can identify and articulate the client’s interests in a 
way that meets the client’s preferences. 23 
The client as friend, or intimate relations justification for zealous advocacy is not without its 
critics. Spaulding has pointed out a contrasting foundation for zealous advocacy, suggesting 
that the justifications based on self-sacrifice are a convenient proxy for self-interest:  
First, we must be willing to suspend the conviction, so deeply embedded in role 
criticism and popular discourse (I have in mind the all too familiar lawyer jokes and 
epithets), that client- centered lawyering is the same as self-centered lawyering,  that 
lawyers who have perverted the service norm for their own interests are ideal typical 
for any client-centered conception of the role. Suspending this belief will be 
difficult.24 
Indeed, in this scepticism one sees a starkly contrasting foundation for zeal suggesting that 
zeal is not based on benevolence and a self-sacrificial prioritising of the client’s needs above 
the lawyers own but rather is based on more selfish and self-centred interests.25 Elkins argues 
that zeal simply reflects the shrouding of lawyers’ more personal interests (status, money and 
promotion) in the language of ‘principles, craft, and ethics’.26 Bowie proposes that these 
interests reflect the foundational motivations of business and economics rather than the more 
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altruistic foundations of a profession.27 This argument can be supported by an analysis of 
professional rules which seem primarily to protect lawyers’ own business priorities, for 
example, some argue that legal professional privilege promotes professional self-interest over 
the clients; or that the cab rank rule protects the reputation and interest of the profession more 
than it serves  a genuine public interest.28  
Equally, as Kruse shows, the jurisprudential turn in legal ethics marked by the work of Simon, 
Wendel and Dare provides a justification different from Fried’s moral claim.29 A pluralist 
justification for zeal draws on a positivist view of law – a zealous lawyer under the 
jurisprudential approach puts justice through the interpretation of law first, making space for 
the client’s morality and the morality of superior decision makers (such as judges).30 The 
claim, nicely captured in Dare’s phrase ‘mere-zeal’, is that while there is a range of 
approaches to the interpretive problem that arises when positive law is uncertain, the basic 
emphasis in jurisprudential approaches to (mere) zeal is some level of restraint: the law comes 
first, the client comes second and the lawyer’s own interests come a (distant?) third.  Indeed, 
Kruse, drawing on Schneyer, points to the importance of identifying a link between excessive 
zeal and the lawyer’s pursuit of their own commercial and reputational interests.31 In broad 
terms, excessive zeal may be marked out by self-interest and appropriate zeal by justice and 
then benevolence. 
Another critique of zeal, relevant to the interpretative problem, emanates from social 
psychology. It suggests that zeal may reinforce, in a harmful way, existing biases in favour of 
the client. So, for example, Perlman argues that ‘placing a lawyer in a partisan role’ can 
adversely affect professional objectivity.32 Such a lack of objectivity may damage the client 
(lawyers being overly confident or overly aggressive on their client’s behalf) and damage the 
public interest (lawyers being overly careless of the restrictions that public interest obligations 
place upon them). In doing so, zealous advocacy creates bias which that may cloud 
objectivity, blur ethical boundaries and lead to improper conduct.33  
                                                 
27
 Norman Bowie, ‘The Law: From a Profession to a Business’ (1988) 41 Vanderbilt Law Review 
741. 
28
 John Flood and Morten Hviid, The Cab Rank Rule: Its Meaning and Purpose in the New Legal Services 
Market (Report for the Legal Services Board London, 2013); Daniel R. Fischel, ‘Lawyers and Confidentiality’ 
[1998] 65 U Chi L Rev 1. 
29
 Katherine R. Kruse, ‘The Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics’ (2011) 53 Arizona Law Review 493.  
30
 ibid, 518. 
31
 ibid, 522. 
32
 Perlman (n 1) 1640. 
33
 ibid 
  
There is some evidence that the work environment within which the decisions are being made 
may have a significant role on the enabling of such bias. This is particularly true of highly 
competitive professions such as the legal profession. Langevoort suggests that the systems of 
promotion for in-house lawyers in corporate contexts may serve to promote risk takers who 
may fully appreciate the risk but choose to act because short term incentives create a risk 
taking bias.34  The law firm environment may also reduce professional independence and 
objectivity where practitioners ‘get too comfortable' or are cognitively ‘co-dependent' with 
their colleagues, adopting the risk taking norms of the organisation rather than objectively 
questioning the ethical position.35 Risk taking behaviour is generally (although not always) 
rewarded by firms because the down side of risk tends not to manifest itself. Those ‘lucky’ 
enough to have taken a risk that pays off are likely to be rewarded as these tend to advance the 
firm, whereas the pay-off from refusing to take a risk is the status quo (or worse, lower 
revenue) with reward less likely. Thus the strongest positive feedback mechanism is towards 
risk-taking and personal gain:  
An above-average tolerance for legal risk and a ‘flexible’ cognitive style in evaluating 
such risk are survival traits in settings where corporate strategy and its surrounding 
culture are strongly attuned to competitive success.36 
The research suggests that the law firm environment, and the structures of promotion and 
esteem, suggest a bias towards risk taking, reduced objectivity and increased zeal in advocacy 
that may serve to encourage less than ethical decision-making founded on self-interest. As 
well as environmental factors, individual personality may play a role in response to 
professional legal ethical dilemmas, as we will demonstrate shortly. In reaching a decision in 
this context, the decision-maker draws on both deontological evaluations centred on rightness 
or wrongness in relation to law, professional rules and, more intrinsic values and evaluations 
of the likely consequences of the decision. These evaluations require an objectivity that is in 
tension with overt pressures and subconscious biases which can lead them to seek to lean 
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towards the client in ways that ‘can have a particularly strong distorting effect’ on objective 
professional judgment.37  
It is tempting to assume that such pressures consist principally of social and economic 
pressures of the ‘he who pays the piper’ type; but Perlman cites a series of experimental 
studies across politics, law and accountancy that highlight the automatic partisan nature of 
representation. Simply thinking of a set of facts with an assumption that facts relate to a client 
biases the interpretation of legal rules in ways that are partial to the imaginary client.38 Thus, 
objectivity is very likely to be compromised in an automatic way that may be under-
appreciated by the lawyers themselves. An undeveloped part of Perlman’s argument is that 
there may be other reasons beyond this client-centred bias for thinking lawyers are vulnerable 
to partisan behaviour. Kreiger argues that, ‘lawyers are tremendously prone to insecurity and 
an unhealthy need for status – a likely manifestation of the related law school paradigms 
around contingent self-esteem and comparative worth.’ 39  A competitive instinct may 
compound the client-centred bias toward winning and self-interest rather than moral or ethical 
decision-making in situations where a tension exists between the two. 
Woolley and Wendel draw on Williams to suggest that while legal ethics discussions are 
dominated by philosophical debates, our approach to such tensions may relate to personal 
traits. A zealous advocate: 
will have a constrained commitment to ordinary moral values and a stronger 
commitment to the role specific moral values of fidelity and zeal. She must be able to 
accept or live with a level of dis-integrity in her moral person, and be willing to be 
highly contextual in her moral analysis.40  
In this way, Woolley and Wendel can be read as seeing zeal as consistent with Fried’s 
emphasis on the lawyer as a friend, but with a diminished valuing of personal morality. It is 
this interest in an ‘individuals personal features …her dispositions, personality, character, 
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cognition, emotions’41 and the idea that it may have an important role in risk taking and 
ethical decisions that our research explores.  
Some circumspection 
In what follows we concentrate on an individual’s psychological motivations; but we should 
emphasise that we are not arguing that personal characteristics or general biases account for 
the entirety of a person’s behaviour. Indeed, legal decision-making reflects the complexities 
of the situations that present themselves to lawyers, how these are presented to them and how 
they are interpreted by them. The power of the situation to influence ethicality is important, 
perhaps more powerful than an individual’s dispositions, and it would wrong to suggest that 
values or biases determine the entirety of any individual’s behaviour.42 Equally, even where 
there is strong situational pressure to behave unethically, most experiments show that a 
proportion of the cohort resist and that individual responses to given situations also vary and 
do so in systematic ways. Individual psychology is part, but part only, of the explanation for 
ethicality. 
Our interest in this paper is in exploring whether an individual’s psychology provides insight 
into the debate about the motivation for zealous advocacy. If zealous advocacy is motivated 
by a concern for clients and if more zealous advocates really do value the client’s interests 
more highly than less zealous advocates then the relational, client-as-friend kind of 
explanation for zeal is supported. If zealous advocacy is motivated by lawyer self-interest, 
then some of the critiques of zeal are supported. In examining the congruence of value types 
and zeal we can shed some light on the question: are those lawyers motivated to be zealous 
advocates more likely to be selfless or selfish-maximisers of the client interests? Such 
arguments do not settle the debate about zeal, but they do inform that debate. 
Values 
At an intuitional level, most people recognise the significance of personal characteristics in 
moral and ethical decision-making. Indeed, ways of describing principles and attitudes: 
cultivated or aspirational virtues, moral or emotional intelligence, moral courage and 
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conscience, 43  ‘moral intensity’ 44  and guilt 45  might all be used to enrich the literature 
surrounding zealous advocacy and ethical decision-making.  
Our approach to understanding lawyers’ underlying individual psychologies of motivation is 
to look at their values. Psychological theory recognises personal values as central to 
personhood defining values as goals, things we would like to gain or protect. 46  Values 
underpin attitudes and moral positions.47 They are pervasive, but also implicit, influences on 
decision-making, acting ‘as standards or criteria to guide not only action but also judgment, 
choice, attitude, evaluation, argument, exhortation, rationalisation and…attribution of 
causality.’48 They ‘frame’ our choices and help us prioritise which elements of any given 
situation we find salient. Personal values are thus central to self and serve as, ‘normative 
standards by which human beings are influenced in their choice among the alternative courses 
of action they perceive.’49 Though fairly stable, they can change over time or in response to 
particularly strong environmental change.50 John Weber demonstrated a close relationship 
between values and moral reasoning with values, mediated through moral reasoning, 
providing the impetus and direction of the resulting decision.51 Indeed, values have been 
associated with ethical decision-making in a variety of professions including business 
consulting, 52  marketing 53  and nursing, 54  and other healthcare professionals. 55  In a legal 
context an association has been identified between values and judicial decision making in the 
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UK Supreme Court.56 Personal values have also associated with ethical decision-making in 
Australian and American law student populations.57 We take this further by examining the 
influence of personal values on ethical decision-making by practising lawyers and the impact 
this may have on the debates surrounding the foundations of zealous advocacy.  
Measuring values 
Personal values can be assessed relatively easily and meaningfully using standardised 
psychometric tools. The most developed and robust psychometric test and model of personal 
values was created by Schwartz.58 The test is trans-situational: it applies across all social 
contexts and is not limited to a specific aspect of life such as work or family life. The model 
seeks to represent most human values and has been assessed in numerous contexts. 59  It 
measures ten overarching motivational values: self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, 
achievement, power, security, tradition, conformity and benevolence and universalism (Table 
1). Although individuals share these values, the prioritisation of values varies among 
individuals; this is key in the psychology of decision-making.60  
Some values are positively related, sharing the same broad motivational emphasis. Power and 
achievement, for example, are positively related because they emphasise social superiority 
and esteem.61 Similarly achievement and hedonism both focus on self-centred satisfaction. 
Other positive relationships include stimulation and self-direction which are both motivated 
by the desire for mastery and openness to change; and universalism and benevolence are both 
concerned with the enhancement of others.62  
As well as showing how the values are organised in relation, and opposition to, each other, 
values can be further simplified into two bi-polar dimensions. The first centres on the conflict 
between values that emphasise ‘openness to change’ and those that resist such change 
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(‘conservation’). ‘Openness to change’ encompasses values that emphasise independence of 
thought, action, and readiness for change (self-direction, stimulation) and ‘conservation’ 
encompasses those values that emphasise order, self- restriction, preservation of the past, and 
resistance to change (security, conformity, tradition).  
The second dimension focuses on the opposition between values that promote ‘self-
enhancement’ and those which emphasise ‘self-transcendence’ values. Self-enhancement 
values emphasise pursuit of ones own interests, relative success and dominance over others 
(power, achievement) and self-transcendence values emphasise concern for the welfare and 
interests of others (universalism, benevolence). Hedonism shares elements of both openness to 
change and self- enhancement.  
To provide greater granularity, we have also used a refinement of Schwartz’ 10 value model 
in one of our studies, developed by Schwartz, and identifying 19 value subtypes providing 
‘greater and more precise insight into the value underpinnings of beliefs’.63 The relationship 
between the models is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Schwartz’s 10 and 19-dimension models 
10 dimension 
model 
19 dimension 
model 
Description 
Self-direction Thought Freedom to cultivate one’s own 
ideas and abilities 
Action Freedom to determine one’s own 
actions 
Stimulation  Excitement, novelty, and change 
Hedonism  Pleasure and sensuous gratification 
Achievement  Success according to social 
standards 
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Power Dominance Power through exercising control 
over people 
Resources Power through control of material 
and social resources 
 Face Security and power through 
maintaining one’s public image and 
avoiding humiliation 
Security Personal Safety in one’s immediate 
environment 
Societal Safety and stability in the wider 
society 
Tradition  Maintaining and preserving cultural, 
family, or religious traditions 
Conformity Rules Compliance with rules, laws, and 
formal obligations 
interpersonal Avoidance of upsetting or harming 
other people 
 Humility Recognizing one’s insignificance in 
the larger scheme of things 
Benevolence dependability Being a reliable and trustworthy 
member of the in-group 
Caring Devotion to the welfare of in-group 
members 
Universalism Concern Commitment to equality, justice, 
and protection for all people 
Nature Preservation of the natural 
  
environment 
Tolerance Acceptance and understanding of 
those who are different from oneself 
 
The significance of values can be seen in the various studies that have correlated values 
profiles and behaviour:64 ‘basic values exhibit predicted associations with attitudes toward 
war, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation;65 attitudes toward human 
rights; 66  interpersonal trust, political activism, and attitudes toward immigration; 67 
environmental attitudes;68 and materialism.69  More generally than attitudes, benevolence and 
universalism, values encompassed within self-transcendence, have also been associated with 
more pro-social behaviour whereas those who rank security and power highly ‘typically 
oppose pro-social behaviour’.70 Values have also been seen to influence our decisions through 
the framing of those decisions. For example ‘self-transcendence values incline bystanders 
who see an assault as a situation requiring help, security values as one to avoid harm.’71 
Finally, values may also impact on the range of potential solutions we can see to any 
problem.72 Outcomes that fit with our value preferences are more satisfying to us.73 They may 
also impact on the extent to which we feel responsibility to become involved in any given 
situation.74  
It should also be noted that the influence of values is not without constraint. As with many 
facets of our psychology, values are influenced by both external and internal modifiers. Our 
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environment and other social actors may influence how the problem is perceived and 
potentially influence the values ‘activated. 75  The influence of values can be altered by 
encouraging problems to be reframed to activate or deactivate different values. 76  Self-
transcendence values can be devalued by minimising the sense of harm resulting from an 
action; portraying potential solutions as less effective or more costly; or diminishing a 
person’s personal responsibility for a situation.77 Thus ‘defensive processes’ may ameliorate 
pro-social values and vice versa. 78 
Psychometric assessment of values in a legal context is rare. McCabe and colleagues 
compared the value priorities of law and business students. Law students valued the equality, 
salvation and wisdom encompassed in universalism more than business students who valued 
hedonism and stimulation more highly. 79  Evans and Palermo started to examine the 
relationship between ethical decisions and values in a population of law students using an 
early psychometric value assessment developed by Rokeach.80 The most important values 
associated with Rokeach’s model of ethical conduct were found to be honesty and equality. 
Under Schwartz’s model honesty, fidelity, reliability, trustworthiness and dependability are 
all encompassed within benevolence, which has an overarching motivation of preserving and 
enhancing the welfare of the in-group. Universalism extends these motivations beyond the in-
group to society as a whole and encompasses respect for dignity, equality and social justice. 
The authors demonstrated an association with a more ethical position and the values 
encompassed within self-transcendence, motivated by the subversion of one’s own needs for 
the greater good of society. 
If we return to the description of values from Woolley and Wendel81 described earlier, we can 
see an association between the universal value motivations of the Schwartz model and those 
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values identified as relevant to understanding lawyer ethics. Woolley and Wendel suggest that 
values such as courage, honesty, justice, respect for dignity, equality of others, fidelity, 
agreeableness, being reliable, trustworthy, orderly, dependable, organised, and rule-following 
for example would be associated with more ethical decision-making. 82  These values are 
largely encompassed in Schwartz’s overarching motivation of self-transcendence, although 
some would be found elsewhere (rule-following is an element of conformity and the referent 
for courage in Schwartz may be best found in self-direction).  
Of particular interest to us in this paper is any relationship between values and zeal. As we 
have seen, proponents of zeal tend to rely on claims of justice, equality and rights. This would 
lead one to expect zeal to be associated with universalism. Other defences centre on the 
concept of friendship, fidelity and responsibility to the client. The best referent for this in 
Schwartz’s model is benevolence, the valuing of the welfare of those close to us (in-group 
members). This does, however, raise the interesting question of who constitutes the in-group. 
For in-house practitioners, is it colleagues, senior executives or a broader group of 
stakeholders; for private practice lawyers would their colleagues, clients or (say) the 
profession constitute the in-group? The logic of Fried’s defence of zeal suggests that the 
clients ought to be regarded as the in-group, so relying on benevolence as a proxy for ‘client 
as friend’ is strongly suggested. As discussed benevolence and universalism are values 
encompassed within the overarching motivation of self-transcendence: concern for the 
welfare and interests of others. In theory, if zealous advocacy is underpinned by universalism 
and/or benevolence, then we would expect zealous lawyers to value benevolence and 
universalism more highly than less zealous lawyers. We would have a new empirical basis for 
accepting that zeal was authentically linked to self-transcendent values. 
Conversely, if the foundation of zeal is a convenient subterfuge for self-interest, then zeal 
would be associated with different value priorities. Values associated with self-interest and 
self-enhancement including achievement (success according to social standards); power 
(dominance): power through exercising control over people or power: resources (power 
through control of material and social resources); face (security and power through 
maintaining one’s public image and avoiding humiliation), and personal satisfaction such as 
hedonism (pleasure and sensuous gratification) might be more strongly valued by zealous 
advocates. 
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In theory then, the values model has the potential to tease out some of the alternative 
understandings of what may motivate zeal; the self-transcendent motivation placing the 
client’s needs first or the self-enhancement motivation of prioritising the lawyers needs for 
success and dominance. 
Looking at value motivations associated with ethical decisions 
In the studies that follow we were able to evaluate the value preferences of lawyers and 
examine any relationships between value preferences and decision-making on ethical 
problems. For our ethical problems, we used the scenarios described below where the more 
zealous pursuit of a client interest is not clearly prohibited but is associated with a more 
ethically risky approach to a problem. For proponents of zeal, the balance between public and 
client interest is a balance to be struck in favour of the client. As we have seen the 
philosophical justifications for that are founded either in justice claims or benevolence (client 
friendship) claims. We test whether the underlying psychology reflects those justifications. 
The data were collected from two different surveys. One recruited 56 in-house counsel (junior 
to senior lawyers) recruited from a large financial services provider, the other included 100 
practising lawyers, 68 lawyers from one very large private practice firm and 32 senior lawyers 
from a variety of commercial in-house positions. 
Both are convenience samples. They were contacted by their employer or the private practice 
firm, and invited to respond anonymously to our online survey. Wedo not have population 
data or random sampling to test representativeness. Our results do not represent all UK 
lawyers, but the data does provides unique insight into the relationship between individual 
personal values and zeal in practising lawyers.  
Survey instruments and value profiles 
The participants were invited to complete a survey which that contained several elements. The 
first element was the psychometric test of value priorities, using the ten dimensions 
Schwartz’s scale in the first survey and the more detailed 19 dimension scale in the second 
survey. Respondents were asked to read a series of descriptions of a person and think about 
how much each person is or is not like them rating statements such as: 
 Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to her. She likes to do things 
her own original way.  
  
 Being very successful is important to her. She likes to impress other people.   She thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. She wants 
justice for everybody, even for people she doesn’t know 
All our respondents were engaged in commercial law practice. The first cohort of in-house 
counsel was employed by a single financial institution, whereas those in the second study 
provided services to several industries including the financial industry, pharmaceuticals and 
utilities companies. The pattern of service provision was comparable to the provision by the 
senior lawyers practising within the commercial law firms who were also surveyed in the 
second study.  
The respondents ranged across a spectrum of length of service with a general emphasis on 
more experienced lawyers. In particular, in the second survey, post qualification experienced 
ranged from seven to 40 years, with a median of 19 years for those based in a law firm and 25 
years for in-house counsel.83 The first survey cohort had a predominance of male respondents 
(60% of the total), whereas only 22% of the respondents were male in the second survey.  
What are the values of commercial lawyers? Does it vary based on the form of commercial 
practice? 
The values priorities identified in both surveys were similar (Table 2). Both groups rated 
benevolence, self-direction and security highly.84 The values that might be associated with the 
stereotypical amoral ‘lawyer’, those of power and stimulation, are located at the bottom of the 
priorities of both legal populations. Interestingly, from the point of view of lawyers as a 
conservative occupation, the values encompassed within tradition are lower for this legal 
sample than for the general UK population. 85  Studies suggest that middle adulthood is 
associated with a reduced emphasis on achievement and stimulation and enhancement of the 
values encompassed in security, conformity and tradition.86 This is not reflected in these legal 
populations: achievement remained a priority value.87 Although it was less of a priority for in-
house counsel working for the large financial provider, there was little difference in the rating 
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of achievement between the law firm and in-house senior lawyers. The low rating of 
universalism in the second cohort is particularly unusual.88  
Table 2: Overall Values Comparison 
 
In-house  
lawyers(54) 
 
Legal Firm and In-
House lawyers (100) 
 
Self-Direction 0.69 Benevolence 1.01 
Benevolence 0.50 Self-Direction 0.73 
Universalism 0.23 Security 0.28  
Security 0.20 Achievement 0.18 
Conformity 0.15 Conformity  0.17 
Achievement -0.05 Hedonism -0.08 
Hedonism -0.28 Universalism -0.14 
Stimulation -0.52 Stimulation -0.48 
Power -0.62 Tradition -0.68 
Tradition -0.88 Power -0.76 
 
There was one significant difference between the first population of in-house counsel and the 
second population (in-house and legal firm) and that was the position of universalism.89 The 
second population rated the universalism significantly lower than the first population. There 
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was no relationship between gender, or the form of practice, and the rating of the values 
encompassed within universalism in this population. 
Table 3: Comparison between Commercial In-House and Legal Firm Lawyers 
Legal Firm (67) In-house (33) 
 
Benevolence 1.02 Benevolence 0.99 
Self-Direction 0.70 Self-Direction 0.78 
Security 0.40 Conformity 0.16 
Achievement 0.23 Achievement 0.06 
Conformity 0.18 Security 0.03  
Hedonism -0.05 Hedonism -0.14 
Universalism -0.12 Universalism -0.19 
Stimulation -0.62 Stimulation -0.20 
Tradition -0.75 Tradition -0.54 
Power -0.79 Power -0.69 
 
To assess whether the differences were related to the form of practice, comparisons were 
made between the values of those who worked in private practice and in-house counsel in the 
second cohort. There was no significant difference in the ranking of universalism between the 
two populations, suggesting that the high ranking of universalism in the first population may 
have been related to the specific cohort. A weaker but possible explanation is that both the 
private practice and in-house lawyers in the second cohort valued universalism more weakly 
than is generally considered ‘normal’ for lawyers. This is something that would need to be 
tested on more data with wider groups of lawyers. Once again achievement was lower in those 
  
who were employed in-house compared with those in private practice but this difference did 
not reach significance.  
Our particular interest is the values associated with zeal. The underpinning assumption is that 
if zeal is really founded on respect for individual rights, self-sacrifice, fidelity and 
responsibility then there would be an association between zeal and the values encompassed in 
self-transcendence (benevolence and universalism). In contrast, if the foundations of zeal are 
centred on the lawyer’s self-interests and personal success, then there would be an association 
with the values encompassed in self-enhancement (achievement and power).  
As we have seen, the value analysis of all the commercial lawyers suggests that commercial 
lawyers whether practicing in a law firm or as in-house counsel rate values encompassed in 
benevolence above the values associated with personal interest such as power. This may 
suggest that some fit between the arguments for zeal and its psychological referents, although 
the relative ranking of universalism is below adult population norms, suggesting that the 
lawyers studied here care about fairness to others less than the broader adult population from 
which they are drawn. In the next section, we test this with greater precision by identifying 
differences in value priorities specifically associated with greater zealous advocacy. 
Did values influence answers to ethical questions? 
As noted above, theory and evidence outside of the world of law suggests a clear relationship 
between values and ethical decision-making. A question of some interest is whether, and to 
what extent, this theory may be true in legal professional contexts. Work questioning the 
objectivity of professional judgement suggests client leaning biases,90 which might suggest 
that we should expect client zeal to be reflective of a benevolent approach to clients. It also 
may be that the influence of values within a legal context has less impact on decision-making 
where there is a clear line of institutional thought and that professional guidance and models 
have a strong influence on ethical decision-making. The theory of zealous advocacy, however, 
is designed to tackle areas where such guidance is not clear: the theory states (with varying 
degrees of emphasis), that where a situation is not clearly prohibited by law or professional 
conduct a lawyer may, or in the strongest versions, must take an action in the client’s interest. 
The client, in other words, gets the benefit of any doubtful situation.  
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To assess if there is a relationship between values, ethical decision-making and zealous 
advocacy, the respondents were asked to consider three different ethical scenarios. These 
scenarios were developed in consultation with experienced practitioners and piloted on a 
small group of practising lawyers for sense and meaning checks. The first is an ethical 
dilemma with a legal basis, but which takes place in a domestic context. The aim here was to 
explore ethics in a non-work context, allowing for the possibility that values might impinge at 
(say) home but not at work. The remaining dilemmas are situated in a legal professional 
context in which the respondents have to balance the client’s interests and professional rules 
and principles.  
The first vignette – Domestic Context 
You come home to find that your son has lent to his friend his CD of the latest best-
selling album and helped his friend ‘rip’ a copy onto his friends MP3 player. Do you: 
(i) Do nothing?; or (ii) Insist the copy is destroyed? 
Both study cohorts addressed this vignette with an average of 75% of respondents stating that 
they would do nothing and only 25% of respondents stating that they would adopt a more 
ethical position and request that the CD was destroyed. 91  In both studies, there was a 
consistent association between values and the decision in this vignette. Those who did not 
want to do anything were significantly more likely to rate the values encompassed in self-
enhancement more highly than those who wished to destroy the illegal copy.92 In contrast, 
those who adopted the more ethical position rated values encompassed in self-transcendence 
higher.93 When individual values were assessed, there was a consistently significant negative 
relationship between the values encompassed within power and the decision to destroy the 
illegal copy.94 This shows that it was those who were less influenced by economic status and 
reward and less interested in control over people and resources who were likely to behave 
more ethically under this scenario. Similarly, there was also a positive relationship between 
the values encompassed within universalism and benevolence and the decision to destroy the 
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illegal copy.95 They were making their child destroy the copy not to exert control over them 
but because it was the right thing to do. 
When these values were examined in more detail in the second survey, it was the element of 
power that was associated with dominance over resources and people, an element of self-
enhancement, which was significantly related to not taking any action. Again, the least ethical 
action, consistent with Schwartz, was associated with those inclined to value self-interest 
more highly. Similarly, two aspects of the value of universalism were significantly related to 
taking the decision to destroy the illegal copy, those who valued concern and tolerance 
thought the right thing to do was destroy the copy.  Both concern and tolerance are associated 
with self-transcendence – prioritising justice and the interests of others over personal 
interests. These data show how in a non-professional environment our respondents a less 
ethical decision is associated with self-enhancement and negatively associated with self-
transcendence.  
Our next problem was set in a legal professional context. Respondents were asked to consider 
a situation where a colleague had installed multiple copies of non-business software for which 
the company has no licence. The decision to do nothing remained an option, but lawyers 
could also take varying degrees of action from simply ensuring the copies were removed; 
reporting the matter internally; or, instigating a wider investigation.  
The number of lawyers who would do nothing in this situation was significantly reduced with 
only 3.6% of the financial in-house lawyers and 2.0% of the lawyers in the second survey. 
They also were reluctant to instigate a wider investigation (2%).Altogether,  96% said they 
would deal with the matter internally, either by reporting it or requesting removal. 
Once again there was a positive correlation between the values encompassed within self-
transcendence and the decision to take positive action, as higher valuing of universalism was 
associated with action.96 There was also a negative correlation with self-transcendence; no 
action being associated with higher valuing of achievement.97 Those who valued conformity 
more highly were more likely to take action. In particular, this was associated with valuing 
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conformity to rules more highly; those who rated interpersonal relationships more highly were 
less likely to take action.  
These two vignettes show how values have plausible relationships with the decision-making 
of our research subjects and those plausible relationships are of the kind we might be looking 
for in understanding the psychological referents of zeal. In our third vignette we look at the 
relationship between values and zeal. This vignette was designed to directly engage 
professional ethical issues of the kind typically in connection with client zeal. Centred on 
advising a client the scenario was described as follows; 
You are advising your Company an engineering company that sells machine tools. 
They want to hurry through transactions which may be in breach of import/export 
regulations in relation to a state subject to arms embargoes. A large proportion of the 
transactions are products unrelated to arms production, but you suspect a small 
proportion relate to dual use items which have the potential for weapons manufacture. 
The Company is frustrated that import/export licence process slows down legitimate 
transactions. You advise that these transactions are highly likely to be in breach 
regardless of the use to which the items are put and if any are found to be dual use 
serious consequences are likely to arise for the Company. Prior to the company 
deciding what to do, should you also advise the client on how to handle the 
transactions so the regulator is significantly less likely to scrutinise them? 
The problem is designed to investigate the extent to which in a situation of modest ambiguity 
(the transaction is highly likely to be in breach) the lawyer is willing to assist with what could 
be framed as a cover-up, but is presented neutrally here in a way that a corporate client might 
present it as ‘avoiding regulatory scrutiny’.98 The answer offered was a simple yes or no to 
force the respondents to indicate a choice. A lawyer inclined to the view that they must or 
may do all that they can to assist a client unless there is a clear prohibition on that action is 
more likely to assist the client by giving the opinion sought in the machine tools. We thus take 
answering yes to this question as a proxy for taking a more zealous advocacy position. A yes 
is more likely to be consistent with the kind of zeal that philosophical justifications for zeal 
seek to justify and less consistent with more restrained versions.99 In the first cohort, 53 
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answered the question, of which only three (5%) responded that they would advise the client. 
In contrast, 19 (27%) of those practicing in a law firm and 11 (34%) of the in-house lawyers 
responded positively in the second cohort. 
Figure 1: Graphic representation of values based on decision reached.  
The graph represents the values of those who would give advice  
and those who would not. * p <0.05 
 
Figure 1 shows that those who indicated they would not advise on how to minimise regulatory 
scrutiny (the majority), valued conformity, tradition and security more highly than those who 
indicated they would give such advice. The differences were not statistically significant 
although the influence of conformity and security were near significance.100  
There was, however, a significant relationship between achievement and the decision reached. 
Those who rated achievement highly were more likely to respond that they would advise the 
client how to handle the transactions so that the regulator is less likely to scrutinise them.101 
Valuing achievement means valuing the social recognition of one’s competence. It is 
encompassed within self-enhancement suggesting that, at least in this instance, zeal in 
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commercial lawyers does not have a foundation in self-sacrifice but is rather motivated, in 
part at least, by self-interest (the desire for validation as good at one’s job). It may not be an 
achievement orientation alone that is having an influence: what may also distinguish our more 
zealous lawyers was, if we emphasise the near-significant results on conformity and security, 
the weaker moderating effect of more conservation oriented values. Neither weaker 
conservation values nor higher achievement values are consistent with the moral claim made 
for zeal that draw on psychological referents: the moral case, as we have emphasised, is based 
on zealous advocates being motivated by universalism or benevolence. 
Conclusions 
Commercial lawyers often signal that ‘client first’ is an essential element of their DNA,102 and 
some scholarly proponents have laid claim to a moral justification for zeal. That moral 
justification is found, in particular, in the notion of lawyers as friends. One critique of zeal is 
that this moral claim is bogus: client-first is a convenient trope for disguised self-interest.  
This paper has explored the empirical validity of this client-first ideal through a value-based 
analysis of zeal in lawyering. Our data suggest plausible differences in ethical decision-
making related to those values. The data are consistent with more zealous lawyers having 
stronger self- rather than client-interested motivation. More zealous lawyers are also less 
constrained by valuing conformity to rules. If our results are valid, they suggest that the claim 
that zeal is motivated by placing a high value on the interests of the client is false. 
We should emphasis the limits of our study before expanding on its significance. As a 
convenience sample, we do not claim that our respondents are representative of all 
commercial lawyers, still less of lawyers generally. Concerns about representativeness are 
partly assuaged because we are measuring differences within the sample; we are looking those 
who were more or less zealous within a fairly elite group of lawyers. The nature of the group 
makes it interesting and important in and of itself, but it does not ‘prove’ that all or most 
zealous lawyers are motivated by self-interest. It would be useful to replicate the study on 
wider and alternative groupings of lawyers in commercial law and elsewhere.103 Similarly, 
devising problems which explored zeal in a wider range of ways and contexts would similarly 
help to replicate and render more robust our findings.  
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Although the survey methodology might be criticised as artificial, our discussions with 
practitioners suggest the problems used were sufficiently realistic to be testing and to engage 
them in a genuine endeavour to ‘find the right answer’ for themselves. That is still some 
distance from being able to claim that the survey shows how respondents would respond to 
similar ethical dilemmas in real life, but it is a reasonable assumption that their initial framing 
of such problems in real life would be similar.  
In other words, the methods used provide a fresh and meaningful insight into the 
psychological referents of zeal, and the claims made for zeal as founded in selfless friendship, 
but we do not claim that they are or should be the last word on the topic. We have shown how 
psychometric tools can be used to explore one limb of the zealous advocacy argument. Our 
evidence tends to rebut the claim that zealous advocacy is founded, in part, on a client-centred 
motivation and support the claim that zeal is a false friend: what distinguishes the motivations 
of the more and less zealous is self-enhancement. In these two surveys, more zealous lawyers 
were more motivated by self-interest than other lawyers. The weaker valuing of conformity to 
rules in the more zealous elements of our cohort is also interesting. As we discussed above, 
lawyers generally are probably prone to a loyalty bias. Seemingly unknowingly, lawyers may 
substantially shade their analysis of case merits towards the interests of their client. A weaker 
valuing of conformity to rules might aggravate this problem.  
Also interestingly the findings, if more robustly tested and developed, may suggest problems 
for jurisprudential justifications of zeal. Remember that there the primary motivation was 
fidelity to the law: if more zealous advocates are less likely to value conformity to rules then 
they are less likely to value fidelity to the law. While this remains speculation on our part, it is 
speculation worth voicing; it may even be that in relation to Dare’s mere-zeal, it should be 
restraint and not zeal that is emphasised. However a much fuller range of zeal invoking 
scenarios would need to be tested to look at this adequately though. 
Even were such findings to be more widely replicated, we do not claim that the case for 
zealous advocacy is completely undone by this kind of motivational analysis. The ‘client first’ 
type of argument is but one justification for zeal. Other justifications may still have some 
traction: zeal may be a rationally superior yet psychologically conflicted approach. What our 
analysis suggests is that it is possible to test, and refute, the claim that zealous lawyers are 
particularly motivated by benevolence to the client, or concern for justice, or fidelity to the 
  
law. It is evidence that the claim that zeal represented an idealised beneficence towards the 
client is a hollow one.  
More generally the study supports the view that basic values influenced lawyers in their 
approach to ethical problems. If, as lawyers, we are keen to think of ourselves as hyper-
rational beings, our rationality may need to encompass an acceptance and awareness of our 
values as initial framers or influencers of judgment. A number of corporate scandals have 
questioned the value of lawyerly zeal: Standard Chartered Bank, the News of the World, BNP 
Paribas and General Motors can all point to actions of their lawyers who zealously sought to 
promote the client’s short-term interests and undermined their long term interests. A values-
based analysis helps us to understand how such errors may be founded, in part, on a 
prioritisation of the lawyer’s own interests, rather than those of the client. Our final 
suggestion of an implication is this: if lawyers think they are helping a client, when in fact 
they are motivated by helping themselves, then they are more likely to make mistakes that 
damage the profession and those they serve. Whether we should abandon notions of zeal, or 
temper them with a more sophisticated notion of client centrism104 or restraint we cannot say 
– but we should certainly be a little worried about the values at work when lawyers claim that 
the sine qua non of their professionalism is that they put the clients first. 
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